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Security Feb 17, 2026 ⏱ 16 min read

7 Cybersecurity Blind Spots That Enterprise IT Ignores Until It's Too Late

Your firewalls are solid. Your endpoint protection is current. Your SOC runs 24/7. And you're still getting breached — because the threats you're not watching are the ones that take you down.

The Invisible Threat Surface

Enterprise security teams spend 80% of their budget on perimeter defense and endpoint protection. These are important — nobody is suggesting you turn off your firewall. But according to IBM's 2025 Cost of a Data Breach Report, the average breach now takes 277 days to identify. That's not a perimeter failure. That's an internal visibility failure.

The breaches that make headlines — SolarWinds, MOVEit, Change Healthcare — didn't succeed because of weak firewalls. They succeeded because attackers found the seams: the unmonitored service accounts, the forgotten APIs, the over-permissioned credentials that nobody reviews because they "just work."

These are the blind spots. And if your security team isn't actively hunting for them, you're waiting for an attacker to find them first.

277
Days to Identify Breach
$4.88M
Avg Breach Cost 2025
73%
Breaches via Blind Spots
68%
Involve Human Element

Blind Spot #1: Service Account Sprawl

Every enterprise has them. Service accounts created for integration between systems — the Active Directory account that syncs HR data, the SQL Server service account that runs nightly ETL, the Azure service principal that deploys infrastructure. They're created with good intentions and then forgotten immediately.

Why It's Dangerous

  • No MFA — service accounts can't use multi-factor authentication because there's no human to respond to the prompt
  • Over-privileged — created with admin rights "to make sure it works," then never scoped down
  • No password rotation — passwords set once, never changed, sometimes stored in plaintext in config files
  • No ownership — the person who created it left the company 3 years ago; nobody knows what it does
  • Not monitored — SIEM rules focus on user accounts; service account anomalies go undetected
The Real Risk

In the 2024 Microsoft breach, attackers compromised a legacy test OAuth app with over-permissioned service credentials. This gave them access to senior leadership email. The service account had been dormant for years but retained full Exchange access. One forgotten account, billions in damage.

Mitigation

  • Inventory all service accounts across AD, Azure AD/Entra ID, databases, and applications
  • Implement Managed Service Accounts (gMSA/sMSA) or workload identities that auto-rotate credentials
  • Apply just-in-time (JIT) access for service accounts that don't need persistent permissions
  • Create SIEM alerts for service account login anomalies (unusual hours, unusual source IPs)
  • Quarterly access reviews with automatic disabling of unused accounts

Blind Spot #2: Software Supply Chain Attacks

Your code is secure. Your dependencies are not. The average enterprise application has 200+ direct dependencies and 1,500+ transitive dependencies. Each one is an attack surface you don't control.

Attack Vectors

  • Typosquatting — malicious packages with names similar to popular ones (e.g., requests vs. reqeusts)
  • Dependency confusion — registering a public package with the same name as a internal package
  • Maintainer compromise — attackers gain access to a maintainer's NPM/PyPI account and inject malicious code
  • Build system poisoning — injecting malicious code into CI/CD pipelines (the SolarWinds model)
  • Abandoned packages — once-popular packages with no active maintainer, ripe for takeover
Attack Type Notable Example Detection Difficulty
Dependency Confusion Codecov breach (2021) High — blends into normal builds
Maintainer Compromise event-stream npm (2018) Very High — legitimate update chain
Build System Poisoning SolarWinds Orion (2020) Extreme — signed legitimate binaries
Typosquatting Multiple PyPI/npm incidents Medium — automated scanning helps
Abandoned Package Takeover ua-parser-js (2021) High — appears as normal version bump

Mitigation

  • Implement a private registry (Artifactory, Nexus) as a proxy — never pull directly from public registries in production
  • Enable Software Composition Analysis (SCA) in CI/CD: Snyk, Dependabot, OWASP Dependency-Check
  • Pin dependency versions and review all updates before merging
  • Generate and maintain SBOMs (Software Bill of Materials) for all production applications
  • Enable npm/PyPI/NuGet audit checks in build pipelines

Blind Spot #3: Internal API Exposure

Your customer-facing APIs have authentication, rate limiting, and monitoring. Your internal APIs — the ones microservices use to talk to each other — often have none of these controls.

Internal APIs are built on trust boundaries: "only internal services call this, so we don't need auth." Then someone exposes the Kubernetes cluster through a misconfigured ingress, or a developer accidentally sets up a port forward that stays open, or a VPN user gets compromised. Suddenly, that "internal-only" API that returns customer PII with no authentication is reachable from the internet.

Common Internal API Vulnerabilities

  • No authentication — "It's internal, we trust the network"
  • No authorization — any authenticated service can access any endpoint
  • No rate limiting — an attacker can exfiltrate millions of records without triggering alerts
  • No input validation — SQL injection is still rampant in internal services
  • No logging — internal API calls aren't sent to the SIEM
  • Swagger/OpenAPI docs exposed — internal API documentation accessible from the network
The Zero Trust Imperative

"Trust but verify" is dead. Zero Trust means every API call — external or internal — must be authenticated, authorized, and logged. If your internal APIs don't have mTLS, OAuth tokens, or service mesh policies, you have a perimeter made of assumptions.

Blind Spot #4: Shadow AI

Shadow IT was the challenge of the 2010s. Shadow AI is the challenge of the 2020s. And it's far more dangerous because the data exposure is immediate and irreversible.

What's Happening Right Now

  • Employees are pasting customer data, source code, financial reports, and legal documents into ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini
  • Marketing teams are using AI image generators with brand assets and unreleased product photos
  • Developers are using AI coding assistants connected to git repos containing proprietary algorithms
  • Finance teams are uploading P&L statements to AI tools for "quick analysis"
  • Legal teams are summarizing confidential contracts with external AI services

Why Security Teams Can't See It

  • It's web traffic — AI tools are accessed through browsers, not downloadable software
  • It's encrypted — HTTPS makes content inspection difficult at the proxy level
  • It's sanctioned-adjacent — the company uses Microsoft 365 (which includes Copilot), so blocking "AI" is impractical
  • It's productive — employees using AI are genuinely more productive, creating a political problem for security
75%
Employees Using Unsanctioned AI
45%
Paste Sensitive Data into AI
11%
Companies Have AI Policies

Mitigation

  • Publish an AI Acceptable Use Policy that's practical, not prohibitive — ban external AI for specific data classifications, not all AI use
  • Deploy a sanctioned AI platform with data loss prevention (DLP) guardrails — Azure OpenAI, Amazon Bedrock, or enterprise ChatGPT
  • Implement CASB (Cloud Access Security Broker) rules to detect and alert on data uploads to unsanctioned AI services
  • Train employees on what data can and cannot be shared with AI tools
  • Monitor DLP alerts for sensitive data classifications being sent to AI endpoints

Blind Spot #5: DNS Infrastructure

DNS is the internet's phone book, and virtually no enterprise monitors it properly. Attackers love DNS because DNS traffic is almost never inspected, even by organizations with mature security operations.

DNS Attack Vectors

  • DNS tunneling — exfiltrating data by encoding it in DNS queries (your firewall allows DNS by default)
  • Subdomain takeover — dangling CNAME records pointing to decommissioned services (Azure, AWS, Heroku) that can be claimed by anyone
  • DNS rebinding — bypassing same-origin policy to access internal services from a browser
  • Lookalike domains — registering domains similar to your brand for phishing (garnetgr1d.com, garnet-grid.io)
  • DNS cache poisoning — redirecting your employees to malicious versions of legitimate sites

Mitigation

  • Deploy DNS security solutions (Cisco Umbrella, Infoblox BloxOne, Cloudflare Gateway)
  • Monitor DNS query volumes and patterns for anomalies
  • Audit all DNS records quarterly — remove dangling CNAMEs
  • Implement DNSSEC to prevent cache poisoning
  • Register common typosquatting domains for your brand proactively

Blind Spot #6: Backup Targeting

Ransomware operators learned from their early mistakes. Encrypting production systems is effective, but if the victim can restore from backups in 48 hours, the leverage disappears. Modern ransomware groups now target backups first, encrypt production second.

How Backups Get Compromised

  • Same domain credentials — backup servers joined to the same AD domain as production; when domain admin is compromised, so are backups
  • Network-accessible storage — backup NAS shares accessible from production servers via SMB/NFS
  • Backup admin credentials stored in scripts — automated backup scripts with hardcoded passwords
  • No immutability — backup data can be modified or deleted by anyone with admin access
  • No isolation — backup network not segmented from production network
  • No restoration testing — backups exist but have never been successfully restored
The 3-2-1-1-0 Rule

3 copies of your data. 2 different storage media types. 1 copy offsite. 1 copy immutable (cannot be modified or deleted, even by admins). 0 errors verified through automated restoration testing. If your backup strategy doesn't follow this rule, you don't have a recovery strategy — you have a hope strategy.

Blind Spot #7: Identity Sprawl Across SaaS

The average enterprise uses 371 SaaS applications. Each one has its own identity system, its own permissions model, and its own admin portal. Your Active Directory or Entra ID might control access to 60% of them. The other 40% — the marketing tools, the developer tools, the departmental apps purchased on corporate credit cards — have standalone credentials that nobody manages.

The Identity Problem

  • Orphaned accounts — employee leaves, HR deactivates AD, but 15 SaaS apps still have active accounts with their personal email as recovery
  • Shared credentials — team accounts for social media tools, analytics platforms, and design tools (shared among 10 people, password never changed)
  • OAuth consent sprawl — employees granting third-party apps access to their cloud drive, email, calendar ("Allow this app to read your contacts")
  • Admin sprawl — 47 people with admin access to various SaaS tools, most unjustified
  • No centralized visibility — security team can't answer: "What applications does this user have access to?"

Mitigation

  • Deploy SaaS Security Posture Management (SSPM) tools — Adaptive Shield, AppOmni, Obsidian Security
  • Mandate SSO for all SaaS over a spending threshold ($500/month)
  • Implement automated offboarding that covers SaaS accounts, not just AD
  • Audit OAuth consents quarterly with automated revocation of excessive permissions
  • Enforce SCIM provisioning/deprovisioning for critical SaaS applications

Anatomy of a Blind Spot Breach

Here's how a typical blind-spot breach unfolds. This isn't hypothetical — it's a composite of real incidents:

Phase What Happens What Security Sees
Day 1 Attacker finds orphaned service account credentials on GitHub Nothing
Day 3 Logs into VPN with service account (no MFA) Normal VPN login
Day 7 Discovers internal API with no auth, begins data reconnaissance Normal internal traffic
Day 14 Exfiltrates data via DNS tunneling Normal DNS queries
Day 30 Accesses backup server using same domain admin creds Normal admin activity
Day 45 Deletes backup catalogs, encrypts production Incident detected (too late)
Day 46 Ransom note: $5M. Backups destroyed. Data exfiltrated. Full-scale incident response

Every single step in this chain exploits a blind spot. Not a vulnerability. Not a zero-day. A blind spot. An area that was technically within the security team's responsibility but practically outside their visibility.

The Blind Spot Mitigation Checklist

Score your organization. For each item, answer honestly — not "we have a policy" but "we actively monitor and enforce this":

# Question If "No"
1 Can you list every service account in your org and when it last authenticated? High risk — immediate audit needed
2 Do you generate SBOMs and scan all dependencies in CI/CD? Medium risk — implement SCA tools
3 Do internal APIs require authentication and authorization? High risk — deploy service mesh or API gateway
4 Do you have an AI acceptable use policy with DLP enforcement? High risk — employees are already using shadow AI
5 Do you monitor DNS queries for tunneling and exfiltration? Medium risk — deploy DNS security
6 Are your backups immutable and on a separate authentication domain? Critical risk — ransomware will destroy them
7 Can you answer "what apps does user X have access to" in under 5 minutes? Medium risk — deploy SSPM or CASB
Our Take

Security isn't a product you buy. It's a visibility problem you continuously solve. The enterprises that don't get breached aren't the ones with the biggest budgets — they're the ones that obsessively hunt for what they can't see. If you're not looking for your blind spots, someone else is.

GG
Garnet Grid Engineering
We help enterprises find and close the security blind spots that conventional tools miss — before attackers exploit them.

Don't Wait for the Breach to Find Your Blind Spots

Our security assessment identifies the gaps that conventional audits miss — the service accounts, the internal APIs, the identity sprawl that won't show up until it's too late. Let's find them before attackers do.

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